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T
he current international ﬁ  nancial crisis has 
resulted in calls for improvements in risk-
management systems in ﬁ  nancial institutions 
(FIs), and an increased role for regulators dealing with 
these systems.
1 These recommendations make a 
distinction between macroprudential and micropru-
dential regulation. Microprudential regulation deals 
with the detailed regulation of a bank, including its 
risks and capital adequacy. Macroprudential regula-
tion focuses on system-wide risks, which result 
from risks that occur in the trading that takes place 
between banks and the rest of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
This article will not deal with the various recommen-
dations that have been made with regard to macro-
prudential regulation, but will focus instead on the 
important interface between microprudential and 
macroprudential regulation. This interface is critical in 
bank and FI risk management, as well as in attempts 
by microprudential regulatory systems to deal with 
the impact of systemic macroprudential effects on 
individual banks or FIs. 
What is not widely appreciated are the complexities in 
managing risk-management systems. Designing and 
operating these systems is a difﬁ  cult task, requiring 
a careful blend of modern ﬁ  nance and banking theory; 
quantitative methods; and judgment based on long 
experience in credit analysis, legal and accounting 
rules, and other key areas. Yet too often it is assumed 
that improvements can be made by better use of data, 
increased microprudential regulation, reducing 
perverse incentives, and so on. These are all worthy 
*   This article has drawn material from a longer and more technical working paper (Milne 
2008b).
†   Special Adviser at the Bank of Canada, 2008–09.
1  There are several international reports. For example, see the de Larosière report (2009) 
to the European Central Bank. For the United Kingdom, see the Turner Review (Financial 
Services Authority 2009a) and the response of the Financial Services Authority (2009b). 
For the United States, see Acharya and Richardson (2009), which provides a detailed 
analysis of the crisis and of various regulatory failures and reforms. 
Risk-management systems in ﬁ  nancial institutions  • 
have come under increasing scrutiny in light of the 
current ﬁ  nancial crisis, resulting in calls for 
improvements to these systems and an increased 
role for regulators dealing with them.
The basic theory and practice of modern risk  • 
management is complex. Given the serious 
failures manifest in the current crisis, some 
possible strategies that can improve the per-
formance of risk management and regulatory 
practice should be considered.
Prudential regulation should focus on failures  • 
within the ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm and in the market inter-
actions between ﬁ  rms. 
Market failures resulting from liquidity and systemic  • 
risks call for new techniques that will require the 
input and co-operation of ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
regulators. 
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the risk-management process. I will argue that the 
complex issues involved require careful analysis of 
the theory and application of modern risk-management 
systems, and, in particular, that the basic theories 
underpinning many asset-trading and risk-management 
systems in FIs have assumed away systemic effects. 
Thus, they mislead some FIs into taking on unmeas-
ured systemic risks. Although experienced risk 
managers use the quantitative systems as a guide, 
they adapt decisions to take into account qualitative 
information and effects that are unmodelled, or were 
difﬁ  cult to model, in the current systems. In spite of 
this complexity, however, and the serious failures 
manifest in the current crisis, there are ways to make 
the necessary changes. In this article, I propose to 
review some possible strategies that can improve the 
performance of risk management and microprudential 
regulatory practice. 
Using this microanalysis, or “bottom-up” approach, 
permits light to be thrown on possible causes of 
systemic risks in the ﬁ  nancial system. Links can also 
be drawn between the microprudential regulation of 
risk-management systems and the missing elements 
in these systems that imply systemic risks. To under-
stand this argument, the basic FI risk-management 
problem needs to be explored, considering its strengths 
and weaknesses. FI risk-management systems should 
then be embedded in markets with interacting FIs, 
thus providing the links between FIs and ﬁ  nancial 
markets. This latter technique is sometimes called a 
“network” approach,
2 but economists will recognize 
it as a general-equilibrium analysis for a competitive 
economy, or as a strategic approach in the industrial 
organization literature on oligopolies. An additional 
beneﬁ  t of this type of analysis is that it provides a 
consistent framework for discussing both micropru-
dential risk-management analysis and problems with 
systemic risk. The framework is not complete—there 
are serious gaps in our knowledge—but this can be a 




Risk-management systems have evolved over many 
decades. FIs that issue credit have long used credit-
ranking systems to manage their credit books. As 
well, they use other methods to manage credit risk, 
2  For an early analysis of this problem, see Allen and Gale (2000). See also their survey of 
the more recent literature in Allen and Gale (2007, Chapter 10). 
such as adjusting rates, collateral, and individual 
exposures, and procedures for workouts in default. 
Because much of the lending book was largely illiquid, 
banks had limited ability to hedge their risks. Over 
time, these systems have become increasingly mech-
anized through credit-scoring systems and other 
means. But big changes have occurred more recently 
when securitization allowed FIs increasingly to hedge 
and trade credit risks. This required different methods 
for pricing, hedging, and managing credit exposures 
that had to be integrated into more traditional systems. 
Fundamental problems occurred in that integration, 
problems that became obvious during the recent crisis.
The problems for private sector risk-management 
systems can be grouped in two broad categories: 
(i) the underlying theoretical formulation of risk-
management systems, and (ii) statistical calibration. 
The existing models are a synthesis of traditional credit 
systems and the efﬁ  cient-markets (Arrow-Debreu) 
model of trading, hedging, and pricing assets. This 
model, if taken seriously, implies that there is a 
dynamic factor structure that can be used to price 
assets. These factors (after diversiﬁ  cation) can be 
traded in frictionless, competitive markets and used 
to price assets by arbitrage methods. In essence, 
the model is a general-equilibrium economy plus a 
dynamic linear system for hedging and pricing assets 
and their derivatives. Unfortunately, this model implies 
that the ﬁ  nancial system and trading of ﬁ  nancial 
derivatives do not add economic value; it is welfare 
irrelevant. Modern banking theory takes this theor-
etical deﬁ  ciency seriously and introduces various 
frictions to make sense of banking, ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediation, and sophisticated ﬁ  nancial systems. The 
internal credit and trading operations of FIs are not 
seen as substitutes for markets, but as comple-
mentary institutions, solving complicated agency and 
informational problems that the frictionless market 
cannot solve.
3 
Banking theory has made very limited inroads into 
the theory and practice of risk management, where 
modelling has been dominated by the frictionless, 
efﬁ  cient-market model masquerading under the title 
of ﬁ  nancial engineering. Literature on the latter topic 
has recently been attempting to cope with the theor-
etical complexities introduced by frictions (e.g., 
transactions costs and illiquidity) through reduced-
form methods; however, the more general strategic 
problems of concern in the banking literature have 
been ignored. The theoretical risk-management 
3  For an excellent, readable discussion of this point plus insightful comments relating to 
risk management and regulatory failures in the crisis, see Hellwig (2008). 
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liquidity into the models are surveyed in this article. 
A further problem is that most banking-theory models 
are relatively simple and of low dimension. They are 
exploratory, examining logical possibilities that could 
be consistent with stylized facts, but are far from 
being operational in any risk-management system. 
This is one of the serious gaps in our knowledge.
Serious practitioners of risk management 
understand this complexity only too well 
and are aware of the dangers of ﬁ  xations 
on spurious model and statistical 
precision.
The second deﬁ  ciency in risk-management systems 
concerns calibration of the frictionless risk-manage-
ment model. Calibration of risk-management models 
relies heavily on historical time-series and cross-
section ﬁ  nancial data, which exhibit well-known non-
stationarities that are difﬁ  cult to predict. Far from 
being a statistical analysis of a ﬁ  xed mechanical 
system (the prototype for ﬁ  nancial-engineering 
methods), sophisticated use of the models involves 
exploiting a degree of judgment to allow for non-
quantitative observations, experience, ﬁ  nancial 
market innovation, legal changes, and a myriad of 
other risks. Serious practitioners of risk management 
understand this complexity only too well and are 
aware of the dangers of ﬁ  xations on spurious model 
and statistical precision (“polishing the hubcaps on a 
rustbucket”). Some progress is possible in this area, 
but the results may not be all that signiﬁ  cant. Clearly, 
longer and more detailed data series will help, but the 
fundamental causes of the non-stationarity reduce the 
beneﬁ  ts of adding older data.
At the regulatory level, a further layer of complexity 
is added in dealing with systemic risks. Whereas the 
risk-management systems in FIs take the environment 
as given—assuming a partial, competitive, frictionless 
approach—systemic risks require a model of the 
ﬁ  nancial system to track interactions between FIs and 
possible interactions with the real economy. An added 
requirement, if regulatory intervention is to be justiﬁ  ed, 
is to explore plausible market failure(s).
4
4  This approach has been stressed by Allen and Gale (2007). The argument has been 
taken up by Milne (2008a, 2008b)  and Acharya et al. (2009).
One such friction could be illiquid asset markets.
5 
There are prototype models that introduce various 
types of illiquidity into asset-portfolio models and 
arbitrage-pricing methods. In the following sections, 
some basic model approaches will be sketched, along 
with indications as to how they may be introduced 
into risk-management systems. Modelling illiquid 
markets can provide a consistent framework to explore 
a modiﬁ  ed risk-management system for each FI and 
justify plausible regulatory intervention that is impos-
sible in the frictionless model. In short, illiquid markets 
can yield a form of pecuniary externality where a trade 
in an asset by one FI can alter prices and spill over via 
price and/or wealth effects into other FIs. 
Risk-Management Theory
The simplest model of a risk-management system is 
the conventional two-date portfolio model, where the 
FI has assets and liabilities today and the distribution 
of net returns can be estimated tomorrow.
6 The 
objective of risk management is to obtain accurate 
estimates of the return distribution and, in particular, 
the tail loss (i.e., low-probability losses). This estima-
tion problem is not straightforward. 
The FI’s asset exposures are divided into various 
asset classes; e.g., stocks, mortgages and commer-
cial loans, and derivatives products in the trading 
books. Each asset class has its own unique return 
characteristics and estimation problems. To begin, 
consider the basic portfolio model taught in every 
undergraduate or MBA investment course, which can 
be made more operational by assuming that asset 
returns can be explained by a linear function of 
some basic risks or “factors.” The easiest example of 
this type of argument is the so-called “market model,” 
in which stock returns are assumed to be a linear 
function of the short-term interest rate, the market 
return index, and a random-error term. Each random 
risk factor is multiplied by a “factor loading” that 
measures the relative importance of the risk factor in 
explaining the impact of that factor on the stock return 
being modelled. The model can be extended by 
adding other random factors; e.g., long-term bond 
yields. The assumption that returns are generated by 
random factors has a long history in applied ﬁ  nance 
and underlies all risk-management systems. 
5  I am not implying that this is the only type of externality possible. Counterparty risks 
would be another example.
6  Standard risk-management references discuss this type of model. See Crouhy, Galai, 
and Mark (2001) and Jorion (2007).
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large, diversiﬁ  ed equity portfolio—so that the port-
folio-weighted random-error terms could be summed 
to approximately zero by the Law of Large Numbers—
then the diversiﬁ  ed portfolio return could be approxi-
mated by a linear combination of the factor returns. 
Furthermore, in diversiﬁ  ed portfolios, the prices of the 
assets would be restricted by possible arbitrage 
trades. To illustrate, ignore the random errors (diversi-
ﬁ  able terms) and assume that the number of factors 
is small—say, two. A current price for each factor can 
then be deduced using elementary linear algebra. 
Employing these factor prices, every current stock 
price can be written as a linear combination of the 
underlying factor prices employing the coefﬁ  cients 
as weights. If this linear pricing rule was not true, then 
any investor could take a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of stocks 
and make unlimited proﬁ  ts. This factor-pricing theory 
has various names, depending on the application: the 
arbitrage-pricing theory; a 1-period version of ﬁ  nan-
cial derivative pricing; or the generalized Modigliani-
Miller theorem (see Milne 2003, Chapters 4 and 7). 
Hedge funds use sophisticated variants of this basic 
methodology.
Financial economists observed that this 1-period 
method (or more sophisticated multi-period versions) 
for pricing assets was simple and relatively easy to 
implement with standard econometric techniques. But 
it had several limitations: The theory assumed a 
number of random factors, but did not explain how 
the factors were chosen, or whether the factors that 
were selected varied over time. In trying to identify 
the factors, regression or factor analysis (Principle 
Components) could be used to estimate the number 
and types of factors and the coefﬁ  cients in the linear 
equation. The question was: Were these coefﬁ  cients 
stable over time, or would they be conditional on 
observable market variables? These issues have 
never been fully resolved, although, after strenuous 
empirical testing, there are some candidates for 
common factors. (In standard investment MBA 
textbooks, the stock market index, the short interest 
rate, or industry factors derived from industry equity 
indexes are often quoted as candidates.)
A multi-period version of the model can be modiﬁ  ed 
to allow for a multi-factor return structure, so that we 
can derive a conditional-factor structure for returns at 
each situation in the future. The factor structure of returns 
can therefore be reinterpreted as a conditional-factor 
model, where the coefﬁ  cients should be interpreted 
as conditional, and the number of factors could 
(in principle) vary over time or events.
Were these coefﬁ  cients stable over time, 
or would they be conditional on 
observable market variables? 
This multi-period factor model (for a derivation, see 
Milne 2003, Chapters 8–10) can be used to price 
default-free bonds of different maturities. The trick 
is to observe that zero-coupon bond prices can be 
written as a factor-structure model (simple substitu-
tions can be used to make the same argument for 
bond yields or forward rates). This implies that the 
common factors will affect bond prices, depending 
on the coefﬁ  cients. Because bond prices converge to 
their face value at maturity, the coefﬁ  cients cannot be 
stationary. Other restrictions rule out dynamic arbi-
trage strategies.
These factor models have a further use. They provide 
a building block for derivative pricing that approxi-
mates the celebrated continuous-time Black-Scholes-
Merton option-pricing model (Black and Scholes 1973; 
Merton 1973). The idea is very simple: Assume that 
the stock price evolves according to a one-stochastic-
factor model plus a constant. Assume that the random 
factor is a binomial random variable. Then, using the 
stock and the short-term government bond, a port-
folio can be created to replicate any derivative on the 
stock, one period ahead. Thus, the option price must 
equal the price of the replicating portfolio (otherwise 
arbitrage proﬁ  ts exist). Using this argument iteratively 
over time—assuming that the volatility parameter on 
the random factor and the risk-free rate are constant 
over time—a dynamic portfolio strategy can be built 
to replicate any European option payoff on the stock 
at time of maturity. (The payoff to a European stock 
option is  , where   is the stock price 
at a ﬁ  xed exercise date T, and X  is the ﬁ  xed exercise 
price.) Given a dynamic portfolio strategy that repli-
cates the option return at T, the initial value of the 
portfolio strategy and the initial option price must be 
equal to avoid an arbitrage opportunity.
This model is merely a simple prototype for more 
complex models that use more factors, or have more 
complex conditional-volatility structures. Assuming a 
factor structure for bond prices, it is an easy step to 
create a bond-option model where default-free bond 
prices follow a simple factor structure. By 1990, the 
several bond-option models then in existence were 
implemented in short order by major FIs on Wall 
Street.
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same factor idea could be applied to corporate bonds 
that might default. An early model by Merton (1973) 
had demonstrated the basic idea. Using a compari-
son between a European stock option and a levered 
stock, he was able to price the levered stock with the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model. In turn, he was able, 
by assuming the Modigliani-Miller theorem, to deduce 
the value of the defaulting bond as a residual differ-
ence between the value of the ﬁ  rm and its equity 
value. This insight has spawned a whole battery of 
so-called “structural models” that extend this theory 
to price risky corporate debt. Various proprietary 
models have used structural models to price corpor-
ate debt.
7
A second group of models—the “reduced-form” 
models (introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull 1995, and 
other theorists)—avoids describing the details of any 
ﬁ  rm’s ﬁ  nancial structure but models default and 
recovery as other factors in the evolution of the bond 
price. This type of model permits the extension of the 
default-free theory to allow for default as an additional 
random factor. Although simple in outline, the model 
can be extended in several ways; e.g., by allowing for 
additional information in bond ratings to add realism 
to the bond-pricing model. Given this structure, it is 
easy to use the replicating-portfolio idea to create a 
perfect hedge for any credit derivative that can be 
dreamed up. Once the replicating portfolio is created, 
the price of the derivative must, by the familiar arbi-
trage-free argument, be the portfolio price. Other 
variations of these models have been developed 
recently to deal with complex derivatives on credit 
risks, and counterparty risks.
8
Both types of models, and their generalized versions, 
have been used extensively in the credit industry to 
model, price, and hedge credit instruments. In turn, 
the models have been modiﬁ  ed to analyze collateral-
ized debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities, 
and many variations that had allowed previously 
illiquid loans to be securitized and sold as part of 
larger packages or tranches via conduits or special-
purpose vehicles. The underlying factor models used 
in this theory assume particular probability distribu-
tions over factors that explain default risk. Having 
created risk factors, speciﬁ  ed joint-probability distri-
butions, and made assumptions on the covariances 
between defaults of individual loans, a theoretical 
portfolio of loans can be created that reduces risks 
7  See Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2001); and Caouette et al. (2008) for extensive 
discussions.
8  See Lando (2004) and Meissner (2005) for surveys of this literature. 
via standard diversiﬁ  cation arguments. This loan 
portfolio can then be sliced into tranches with 
increasing degrees of default risk. The safest tranche 
is modelled to be almost risk free; the second tranche 
(or mezzanine) has higher risk; and so on. The 
tranches can then be sold in packages of risk that 
mimic corporate bonds with different default risks or 
credit ratings.
In addition to an FI’s trading, credit, and derivative 
risks, other risks can be incorporated into its risk-
management system. In recent years, for example, 
there have been attempts to model operational risks. 
The idea is that some FI losses have been the result of 
errors in pricing, hedging, or processing information; 
employee fraud; computer system failures; acts of 
terrorism; and so forth. The evidence suggests that 
high-frequency small losses can be characterized 
with some degree of accuracy (e.g., small errors in 
entering data), but low-frequency, large losses (e.g., 
large-scale fraud or IT failure) are far harder to esti-
mate; the FI must therefore rely on internal audits, 
backup systems, and other methods to reduce risks. 
The operational-risk models should be used with 
standard auditing and security practices to minimize 
the risks, given the costs of implementation. Other 
examples of risks that are hard to quantify are legal 
risks and reputational risks that can arise in trading 
complex securities.
Risk-Management Practice
Although the general theory outlined above appears 
straightforward, competent implementation requires 
judgment, experience, and knowledge of the pitfalls in 
using the models.
9
To begin at the simplest level, consider the problem of 
the portfolio with equity one period ahead. Assuming 
a Gaussian or normal distribution factor model, the 
ﬁ  rst step is to estimate the means and covariance 
matrix for the stocks. It is well known that the mean 
returns are measured with considerable error. The 
estimation of the covariance matrix will be sensitive 
to the choice of factors. Some methods use pre-
speciﬁ  ed variables; e.g., interest rates, industry 
returns, and stock indexes; others use principal-
component analysis to derive implicit factors; and 
still others use copula methods.
A major drawback of these methods is that the 
estimation is based on time series and cross-sections 
9  See Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2001) and Jorion (2007) for discussions. See also 
Hellwig (2008) and Milne (2008a, b) for more detailed critical observations on 
risk-management theory and practice in the context of the credit crisis. 
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ance matrices that measure the correlations between 
ﬁ  nancial variables are not stable over time. Statistical 
techniques that accommodate non-stationarity in 
these estimates use time-series econometric meth-
ods. By using moving averages or ARCH-GARCH 
estimation techniques, it is possible to estimate 
parameters, but some practitioners ﬁ  nd these 
techniques too noisy and not sufﬁ  ciently forward 
looking. They prefer forward-looking implied volatil-
ities and covariances derived from derivative-pricing 
models. Sophisticated FIs modify the parameters, 
particularly mean estimates, by incorporating analyst 
estimates based on careful examination of information 
published by corporations and the ﬁ  nancial services 
industry.
We can show some basic examples of rapid changes 
in ﬁ  nancial variables that defy simple time-series 
modelling from past observations. A quick perusal of 
U.S. corporate bond spreads (measuring default risk) 
over time, show low spreads until mid-2007, followed 
by a large spike over the duration of the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
(Chart 1). Similarly, we can see the large spike from 
mid-2007 in the yield spreads for investment-grade 
ﬁ  nancial issuers (Chart 2). Finally, observe measures 
of volatility in basic stock and option indexes (Chart 3) 
that defy simple times-series modelling without 
resorting to various “regime-switching” formulations. 
(It is not obvious that these techniques would have 
helped in July 2008.)
Derivatives based on stocks can be analyzed using 
variants of factor models where the net exposures will 
depend on the particular hedge and any residual risk. 
Because derivative models are approximations that 
assume speciﬁ  c stochastic models for stock evolu-
tion, the approximate hedge will be sensitive to the 
number and type of stochastic factors (Brownian 
motion, jump process, variance gamma process, etc.) 
and the accuracy of the estimates of the distribution 
parameters. For exotic options (i.e., more complex 
functions of stock-pricing processes), the hedge can 
be very sensitive to the model assumptions and 
parameter estimates. Sensitivity analysis, which 
simulates such models using different stochastic 
processes, reveals that hedges can imply signiﬁ  cant 
net exposures. Usually, competent risk management 
Chart 1:  Yields on U.S. corporate bond spreads
Sources: Bloomberg and Merrill Lynch  Last observation: 25 May 2009





























Chart 2:  Yield spreads for investment-grade 
ﬁ  nancial issues














Chart 3:  Volatility in global equity markets
The S&P 500 index and the S&P/TSX Composite Index are based on 10-day  a. 
historical volatility.
The VIX is a measure of the implied volatility obtained from option contracts  b. 
on the S&P 500 Index.
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tions in the factors underlying each position to 
diversify the risks in the net exposure of the derivative 
portfolio. But in a situation of major market disruption, 
correlations can change rapidly, increasing in degree 
and destroying hedges, and can expose an FI to 
losses. In extreme cases, the losses can be very 
large, even forcing the FI into bankruptcy. For example, 
consider spreads on sovereign 5-year credit default 
swaps (Chart 4). Notice that until the crisis in 2007, 
the spreads are almost indistinguishable, but after 
the middle of 2007, and especially after mid-2008, 
the spreads jump and widen between countries, and 
become less correlated.
In exotic or complex derivative positions, lack of 
liquidity in the underlying securities can limit the 
effectiveness of hedge positions. If the underlying 
security attracts signiﬁ  cant transactions costs in 
trading, this complication should be incorporated 
into the hedging strategy to cover the costs of 
incomplete hedging. In many exotic derivatives 
markets, writers specialize and earn rents from 
their ability to hedge approximately. New entrants 
into these specialized areas should be wary that 
initial proﬁ  ts may disguise larger losses when prices 
move rapidly against them, or that sudden illiquidity 
in the underlying asset will make planned hedges 
very costly.
Similar problems confront traders in default-free bond 
markets. Models that use factors can be unstable 
over time. The estimation of parameters that corres-
pond to the term structure at any point in time can 
change in unpredictable ways, particularly in turbulent 
markets. For example, in 1998, Salomon Brothers (as 
related in Bookstaber 2007, Chapter 5) were using a 
model of the yield curve, the so-called two-plus 
model (two random factors plus a constant—with the 
constant signalling shifts in Federal Reserve policy). 
The model had worked well to produce a steady 
stream of arbitrage proﬁ  ts over several years. In 1998, 
these proﬁ  ts changed to a stream of losses as the 
ﬁ  xed-income arbitrage group struggled with what 
seemed to be a change in the underlying model. It 
seemed that another random factor had appeared, 
leaving the group holding residual risks, which were 
causing large losses. The risk manager struggled to 
help the group, but in the end, it was shut down. The 
exit had to be disguised and undertaken over several 
weeks, since Salomon’s large positions in the market 
were affecting bond liquidity and could entice arbitra-
geurs to exploit the company. The worst-case scen-
ario would have occurred if Salomon’s sales had driven 
down prices, leading other traders to dump bonds 
and driving prices even further down, thus exacerbat-
ing Salomon’s losses. Bookstaber argues that this exit 
by Salomon’s large bond-arbitrage group made the 
market less liquid and increased the difﬁ  culties faced 
by Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) later in 
the year, when its bond-arbitrage position became 
untenable after the Russian bond default (another 
unmodelled risk).
Fixed-interest derivatives will clearly be affected by the 
underlying fragility of the bond/yield pricing model. If 
the model is misspeciﬁ  ed, then hedging derivatives 
written on yields will imply residual risks. If the risks 
average out, then they can be contained. If they show 
persistent bias, then the model can lead to large 
losses unless swift risk-management action is taken 
to limit trades or change the model.
In all the above models, three major risks stem from 
model misspeciﬁ  cation through either: (i) choosing the 
wrong number of random factors; (ii) inappropriate 
random factor distributions (e.g., normal, symmetric 
distributions rather than skewed distributions), and/or 
(iii) using poor parameter estimates for the coefﬁ  cients 
or factor loadings on risky factors. These risks should 
be tested regularly by back-testing the models 
(looking for systematic deviations from the model 
using actual data), and checking the history of trades 
and the proﬁ  t/loss outcomes on exposures. Because 
all models are merely approximations, losses and 
proﬁ  ts on exposures should be expected. In a well-
speciﬁ  ed and calibrated model, however, the history 
of proﬁ  ts and losses will expose biases. Any detected 
Chart 4:  Spreads on sovereign 5-year credit 
default swaps
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taken. Although this is easy to state as a general 
principle, in reality, the management and estimation of 
risks is far from perfect, especially in periods of high 
volatility, where correlations can change rapidly. New 
asset markets are particularly dangerous, in that they 
lack a long history of price data. A new ﬁ  nancial 
instrument introduced in a bull market is especially 
risky, since statistical estimates may not include data 
from bear markets or volatile trading periods. This can 
lead to under-estimation of risks and to complacency 
in the risk-management system.
New asset markets are particularly 
dangerous, in that they lack a long 
history of price data.
Finally, we consider one of the most difﬁ  cult markets 
to model effectively: the market for credit risks. We 
can model the short-term returns on risky bonds as a 
factor model. But, taking a longer-term view, bonds 
that have default risk can be modelled as a stochastic 
process where the bond prices depend on possible 
future default and the stochastic recovery rates. 
Because default can occur before the bond or loan 
expires, default becomes a strategic decision by the 
lender and the borrower. By using extra credit lines, a 
borrower can avert problems in paying the coupon or 
principal. Clearly, the astute lender will be aware of the 
borrower’s net situation, collateral, other credit 
liabilities, etc. Furthermore, other lenders will be aware 
of any difﬁ  culties and will move to protect their loans. 
As is well known, borrowers with multiple creditors 
will initiate a strategic game where each player will act 
to protect their interests. Traditionally, banks, in 
lending to households or businesses, safeguard their 
interests by imposing collateral requirements and, in 
the case of large loans, through pre-emptive interven-
tion and sophisticated workouts. Because default may 
be precipitated by bad luck or bad management, a 
single lender in a carefully managed workout can act 
to increase the value of its loan by taking actions 
within the conﬁ  nes of the bankruptcy code.
Credit derivative payoffs, hedging, and pricing will 
be sensitive to the speciﬁ  cation of default and any 
strategic decisions by the defaulting ﬁ  rm or lenders. 
This effect has been observed recently in the United 
States, where strategic decisions on default and 
reinterpretations of the bankruptcy code are affecting 
the payoffs of credit derivatives.
With several lenders with different loan conditions, the 
workout is more complicated, since the interests of 
the lenders may diverge. For example, lenders with 
different seniority, collateral agreements, exposures 
through derivatives written on the borrower’s debt, 
and so on can have very different responses to 
liquidation or other courses of action. A smoothly 
functioning workout requires legal and credit sophisti-
cation. The smaller the group involved, the easier it is, 
in general, to manage the workout. The more diverse 
and larger the group, the harder it will be to work 
together without generating mistrust and misunder-
standings. Another factor is lenders who have been 
involved in previous workouts together. Lenders know 
that, in a recurring situation, taking a tough line in a 
current workout can rebound in retaliatory actions by 
other lenders in later workouts. The possibilities for 
gaming in repeated workouts, gaining reputations for 
toughness, etc. can lead to sophisticated play on the 
part of FIs. In turn, this can reduce the beneﬁ  ts to 
inexperienced lenders who are entrants in large loan 
markets.
Given these caveats concerning loan defaults, FIs 
run their loan books by using different models and 
procedures, depending on the type and scale of loan. 
Large loans are managed by using careful legal and 
credit analysis, with continual monitoring for signs of 
distress. Banks use in-house and proprietary models 
to analyze large loan or private bond exposures. 
These models may use detailed structural models as 
inputs to evaluate the ﬁ  rm’s bond or, in the case of 
smaller loans, a reduced-form model may be used 
because it is not proﬁ  table to analyze the details of 
the ﬁ  rm. In reality, elements of both models are used, 
depending on the detail required. If the corporate 
bond is traded in a liquid market, the FI can use the 
market value to check its own valuation methods. But 
many corporate bond issues are illiquid, and constant 
marking-to-market is not an option, so that the FI 
must rely on its own valuations and outside credit-
rating agencies.
Credit agencies specialize in evaluating corporate 
bonds and other credit instruments. Their evaluations 
use various models and data sources to give a bond a 
letter rating (AAA, AA, etc.) that reﬂ  ects default risk 
and expected recovery rate. The agencies alter 
ratings infrequently, arguing that ratings should be 
“through the cycle.” In other words, they do not use 
the most current data; the rating can lag until a major 
event triggers a changed rating. This lag has led to 
embarrassing situations in the past where large 
companies (e.g., Enron) have been in serious ﬁ  nancial 
trouble and yet their bonds have been showing high 
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of the accuracy, methods, and models of credit-rating 
agencies, and alleged perverse incentives in their 
rating of credit instruments.
Small loans (e.g., home mortgages, car loans, credit 
card loans) require different methods for evaluation. 
Because these loans are generally for small amounts, 
FIs have developed inexpensive credit-scoring 
systems that allow rapid evaluation of credit risks. By 
bundling large numbers of these loans and tracking 
their performance, the lender can create a portfolio 
for which, in “normal times,” they can provide a 
reasonably accurate assessment of returns. To 
achieve an accurate valuation, there are several 
important caveats that must be taken into account.
First, the evaluation should draw a careful distinction 
between a healthy economy with low defaults for 
each risk class, and a recession, where default rates 
rise. In the latter case, default and recovery rates can 
alter rapidly, so that relatively safe loans can quickly 
become problematic loans. A loan book that looks 
healthy in normal times can become very risky in a 
recession. For example, observe the rapid changes 
in the level of provisions governing Canadian bank 
loans, which are required to deal with loan losses in 
previous and current recessions. These provisions 
vary over time, and in severity (Chart 5).
Loan books should be evaluated in normal times 
with normal time parameters and stress tested with 
recession-based parameters to check the exposures 
in a downturn. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that 
some FIs neglected to do this form of stress testing, 
either because they lacked sufﬁ  cient time-series data, 
or they did not see the need to undertake such regular 
stress tests, because there was a perception in some 
quarters that monetary policy was making inﬂ  ation-
induced recessions a thing of the past. 
Second, the FI should check the integrity of its lending 
and scoring systems. Because poorly designed 
incentive systems can lead to “loan-pushing” and 
collusion between loan ofﬁ  cers and borrowers, the FI 
should be wary of adverse selection in its loan book. 
This process requires careful auditing and back-
testing to check loan ofﬁ  cer and credit histories. 
(This was a major failing in the originate-to-distribute 
model, where perverse incentives faced by mortgage 
originators increased default risks for the end lenders.) 
The FI should be wary that its highly rated loan portfolio 
may actually be of much lower quality, an occurrence 
that too often becomes apparent only in a general 
downturn.
Third, the loan book should recognize the interaction 
between interest rate changes and default risk. It is 
obvious that increases in interest rates can increase 
default rates and decrease recovery rates. Models of 
loan portfolios should include correlations between 
default risk, recovery rates, and interest rate risks. 
Whether these correlations are stable is another 
matter. The risk management should stress test the 
models to check the integrity of the system.
Fourth, given interest rate risk, loan portfolios will be 
open to prepayment risk where lower rates lead to 
prepayment of loans. If it is not modelled, prepayment 
will imply a fall in loan revenue when interest rates 
fall. Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s in the United 
States suggests that many consumers did not 
appear to take advantage of this prepayment option, 
but they have recently been much more aggressive in 
prepaying mortgages. Therefore, econometric models 
that rely on earlier data may be suspect.
Fifth, loan portfolios will face exposures on declines 
in asset prices. Falls in house prices, for example, will 
have a major impact on mortgage defaults when 
borrowers ﬁ  nd their equity has vanished. This has 
been a very serious problem in the United States, 
given the extreme leverage on many mortgages (the 
so-called subprime problem). Similar risks occur in 
commercial real estate, where property valuations can 
decline rapidly in a downturn, exposing lenders to 
increasing default and recovery risks. 
Sixth, other sources of borrower wealth and income 
can be impaired in a downturn, leading to difﬁ  culties 
in repaying loans. For example, rising unemployment 
in a region (the automobile industry is a good example) 
can lead to mortgage defaults. In addition, a regional 
Chart 5:  Annualized speciﬁ  c provisions for 
Canadian bank loans













2008 2006 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994
%
23 
THE COMPLEXITIES OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMIC RISKS
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2009pricing models assumes frictionless markets. 
Although risk-management practice tries to grapple 
with market liquidity in an ad hoc fashion, the basic 
risk-management theory is founded on symmetric 
information and competitive market models. This 
familiar efﬁ  cient-markets model, if taken literally, 
implies that markets are complete and Pareto optimal 
and that any ﬁ  nancial structure or derivative security 
can be priced by arbitrage-pricing rules. What is 
more, any ﬁ  nancial structure has a zero net present 
value. In this model, if asset markets are complete, the 
allocations are efﬁ  cient, leaving no role for govern-
ment intervention to repair any market inefﬁ  ciency. 
The model can be modiﬁ  ed to be more realistic (i.e., 
so that asset markets are incomplete), but then the 
allocation is generally no longer efﬁ  cient. Furthermore, 
it is well known that the introduction of new asset 
markets acts as a second-best modiﬁ  cation that can 
have perverse welfare results.
10
Traditional banking theory assumes, however, that 
ﬁ  nancial markets, and the market for loans especially, 
are far from perfect. Loan markets (and markets with 
counterparty risks) are plagued by various degrees of 
asymmetric information and the possibility of strategic 
behaviour by lenders, borrowers, competing FIs, and 
regulators. The lender tries to sort borrowers accord-
ing to risk and to avoid adverse selection in acquiring 
bad loans. Lenders try to avoid moral hazard, where 
borrowers will be tempted into taking riskier invest-
ments, paying higher dividends, and so on after the 
loan contract has been signed. Well-funded FIs can 
predate distressed competitors. Regulators and FIs 
are locked in a strategic game where their current 
actions, or perceived strategies, can have signiﬁ  cant 
effects on the current or future behaviour of FIs and 
regulators.
Modern banking theory has tried to explain the 
structure and performance of banks by appealing to 
their historic role in collecting deposits and lending 
those funds to ﬁ  rms, households, and branches of 
government. Recall that demand deposits are callable 
10  This result appears counterintuitive. One would expect that increasing the number and 
type of traded assets would improve welfare. In a partial-equilibrium analysis where all 
other asset prices are ﬁ  xed, this might appear correct. But in a general-equilibrium 
analysis with incomplete asset markets with multiple periods and commodities, and 
multiple agents, where all the effects are traced through agent responses and market 
prices adjust, etc., there are examples where (i) all agents are better off; (ii) cases 
where some agents can be made worse off, some better off; and (iii) in some extreme 
cases, all agents can be made worse off. If an agent in the economy controlled the 
introduction of the new asset market, then they would choose to introduce the asset 
only if it beneﬁ  ted themselves, but not necessarily other agents—they would be a 
monopolist. (For early discussions of these second-best results, based on asset-
exchange economies, see Hart 1976, and Milne and Shefrin 1986. For a textbook 
discussion, see Magill and Quinzii 1996.) At a practical level, there have been 
allegations in the United States that the introduction of certain derivative products by 
some FIs have had a deleterious impact on traders in related markets.
decline in an industry can have a negative impact 
on commercial loans so that commercial loan and 
mortgage defaults and recovery rates will be correl-
ated. 
Aggregation of Exposures
The FI can generate its consolidated return distribution 
by aggregating the loan, equity, trading, and derivative 
books, taking into account any correlations among 
the different books. In particular, model speciﬁ  cation 
and parameter estimation are critical, but the model 
estimation should not be viewed in isolation from the 
rest of the risk-management system. This is especially 
true with credit risks, where default risk is sensitive to 
the incentives and actions of borrowers and other 
lenders.
The resulting estimated distribution of returns, espe-
cially the probability of losses of various degrees of 
severity, is examined, and the value at risk (VaR) 
calculated. Risk-management managers are well 
aware that the VaR measure is only as accurate as 
the estimated return distribution that has been gener-
ated. Furthermore, the VaR measure (which was 
originally motivated by assuming a normal distribution 
of returns on securities over a short horizon) can 
provide a biased measure of the risks faced by the 
FI if the distribution is not normal. Indeed, given the 
non-normal returns on defaulting bonds and wide-
spread use of derivatives and other instruments, it 
should not be surprising that the loss tail of the 
aggregate distribution is not normal, but will be 
fat-tailed, or may even have large bumps owing to 
derivative exposures. In the case of banks and other 
regulated FIs, the reported distribution and VaR will 
be examined to see if they violate Basel II require-
ments (empirical rules of thumb as to the amount of 
capital that should be held by the FI to safeguard 
against default). Given the serious caveats discussed 
above concerning the generation of the return distri-
bution, and the resulting VaR, we should be wary of 
the results and of any policy or regulatory actions 
based on the precision of such constructions.
Limitations in Banking and 
Risk-Management Theory and 
Practice
In the previous sections, the basic theory and practice 
of risk management were outlined, emphasizing 
hedging and the use of market valuations and deriva-
tives. The theory that underlies these hedging and 
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problems in regulating FIs.
Given the potential moral hazard inherent in insuring 
deposits (or other risky FI activities), government 
schemes require careful monitoring to contain the 
incentives of bank management to invest in risky 
loans that will increase default risk for depositors 
and, in turn, be passed on to the deposit insurance 
scheme. A private scheme would face the same 
problem. In principle, this is no different from the 
classic moral hazard problem facing bondholders 
or lenders in a levered ﬁ  rm. One reason given for 
having formal risk-management systems monitored 
by regulators in banks is to provide deposit insurance 
regulators with data to enforce capital requirements 
and to monitor and contain risks that would adversely 
affect their deposit insurance risks. These risks can 
be serious and amount to large sums: The Savings 
and Loans debacle in the United States is an historical 
example of the costs of loose regulation, perverse 
incentives for banks and regulators, and subsequent 
government bailouts.
13
The Savings and Loans debacle in the 
United States is an historical example of 
the costs of loose regulation, perverse 
incentives for banks and regulators, and 
subsequent government bailouts.
Classical banking theory needs to be extended to deal 
with investment banking and other FI activity that does 
not rely on depositors. In this type of FI, the role of 
depositors is taken by short-term lenders operating 
through conduits and other structures. Although the 
model has some differences in detail, the basic story 
is very similar in that the FI is investing long and 
borrowing short. By creating off-balance-sheet 
entities, the FIs tried to reduce their exposures. But as 
recent events have demonstrated, the model failed 
spectacularly.
There is a fundamental problem with the theory of risk 
management. It is motivated by the efﬁ  cient markets 
theory that is calibrated using sophisticated statistical 
methods. Alternatively, recent banking theory is 
motivated by small-dimension models (similar to the 
techniques used in modern industrial organization 
theory) where the complexity of the modern FI is 
13  See Kane (1989); Stern and Feldman (2004); and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006).
by the depositor. If the deposits are invested in liquid 
markets and the bank has sufﬁ  cient equity to remain 
solvent, there is no problem with withdrawals on 
demand. But if the deposits are in higher-yielding 
and illiquid assets, then the bank must have sufﬁ  cient 
lower-yielding liquid assets to satisfy withdrawals. In 
a classic paper, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed 
that it is possible to have a bank run where depositors 
panic trying to liquidate ahead of other depositors. In 
addition, they showed that a stylized model of govern-
ment deposit insurance can eliminate the run equilib-
rium. This basic model has been extended in many 
directions to provide a rich set of theories exploring 
the sensitivity of the result to real shocks and other 
modiﬁ  cations.
11 Indeed, the role of deposits is not 
crucial, and they can be replaced by liquid short-term 
loans. This variation of the model is far more appro-
priate to investment banks and to non-bank asset-
backed commercial paper conduits that do not issue 
deposits but ﬁ  nance illiquid long-term investments 
with short- and medium-term borrowing. These models 
provide a series of related frameworks to analyze the 
discussion in Bagehot (1873) and a subsequent large 
and informal literature discussing banking instability 
and regulation. This informal (and later, the formal) 
theory has been used to justify bank regulation, central 
bank intervention, and public deposit insurance 
schemes. But as Allen and Gale (2007) argue, regula-
tions should be targeted to solve particular market 
failures: Unless particular failures can be identiﬁ  ed, 
regulations and interventions aimed at vaguely speci-
ﬁ  ed “banking instability” may do more harm than 
good.
12
A recent example of such an intervention has been 
the various support mechanisms to large U.S. banks 
introduced by the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
These subsidies to FIs have been deemed necessary 
for the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system, supporting 
FIs that are “too big, or too interconnected, to fail.” 
Some commentators argue that these FIs had a faulty 
business model that underestimated the risks inherent 
in credit markets. Because that business model failed, 
the FIs should have been forced to make an orderly 
exit from the market, and not had their businesses 
subsidized. The subsidies and precedents for future 
11  See Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Allen and Gale (2007) for recent surveys.
12  Allen and Gale observe that some liquidity crises can be misnamed. These liquidity 
“crises” may be optimal, depending on the source of the demand for liquidity and the 
structure of the ﬁ  nancial market. If asset markets are competitive and complete, then 
liquidity demands by depositors can be efﬁ  ciently accommodated by the private market 
and agents. But if asset markets are incomplete and/or uncompetitive and inefﬁ  cient, 
then liquidity demands may imply inefﬁ  ciency, and possible regulatory or central bank 
interventions may be justiﬁ  ed. This is the ground for rationalizing liquidity intervention 
by central banks as a lender of last resort.
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current crisis that ﬁ  nancial risk-
management systems have been 
inadequate in dealing with liquidity and 
other systemic risks. 
A second notion of liquidity involves market depth, 
where the size of a trade can inﬂ  uence an asset price. 
Economists know that this phenomenon demonstrates 
market power on the part of the trader. Several recent 
papers have explored the consequences of market 
depth, theoretically and empirically. As a ﬁ  rst step, 
consider a simple situation where an FI faces a liquid, 
riskless asset and an illiquid asset, where there is 
an underlying stochastic price process that will be 
affected by the FI’s trades. Simple examples show 
that this problem is non-trivial to analyze, and can 
induce selling parcels of the asset over time, so as 
to avoid dumping the asset in a one-time ﬁ  re sale. 
More complicated situations can be constructed 
when there are several illiquid assets, forcing the FI 
to choose which asset to liquidate, how much per 
period, and in which order. This problem involves a 
tricky analysis of dynamic portfolio rebalancing, 
owing to correlated risks and illiquidity.
A related but even more complex problem occurs 
when the FI is aware of other traders who can inﬂ  u-
ence asset prices. To begin, consider two FIs that 
have simple portfolios of a riskless liquid asset and 
one risky illiquid asset. Assume that the risky asset 
has a residual demand coming from a large fringe of 
small traders. Economists recognize this model as a 
dynamic Cournot oligopoly model.
15 Although the 
verbal description of the model seems simple enough, 
its analysis is far from straightforward. It is possible, 
for example, to construct situations where a distressed 
FI
16 desiring to sell down the illiquid asset, will be 
front-run by their competitor (i.e. the competitor will 
sell the asset earlier than the distressed trader), thus 
driving down the price even further, before the com-
petitor, exploiting the competitive fringe, buys back at 
a low ﬁ  re-sale price. There are numerous variations on 
this story, some of which allow for strategic behaviour 
by an interventionist central bank. These strategic 
models are still in an elementary stage and require 
15  The following discussion is a brief, informal exposition of the paper by Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2005). Recent research on strategic liquidity problems draws on the 
insights of this and more recent, related papers.
16  The distress can come from a variety of causes; e.g., mass withdrawals, major portfolio 
losses, binding VaR constraints, or margin calls that require portfolio rebalancing. 
characterized by a series of related, but not wholly 
consistent, models. Although this modern banking 
theory is highly instructive in exploring the subtleties 
of banking structures, it is not operational in the way 
that risk-management systems have been used by 
FIs. There is a clear gap between theory and practice 
in trying to have an operational theory that incorpor-
ates signiﬁ  cant elements of the frictions we see in 
banking and other FIs and yet can be implemented 
using existing or obtainable data.
Risk-Management Systems: 
Problems in Modelling Liquidity 
and Other Systemic Risks
It has become apparent during the current crisis that 
ﬁ  nancial risk-management systems have been inad-
equate in dealing with liquidity and other systemic 
risks.
14 This is not just a matter of laxness on the part 
of banks or other FIs, but a serious deﬁ  ciency in the 
basic theoretical models used in risk-management 
systems. Although there are attempts to add “liquid-
ity” risks at the end of the risk-management analysis, 
these are an afterthought. Although we do have some 
simple theoretical models of asset markets, portfolio 
strategies, and asset pricing with various notions of 
illiquidity, these models would require much more 
work to integrate them into workable risk-management 
systems. 
Illiquidity can be modelled in several ways. In the 
simplest formulation, it can be modelled by assuming 
a ﬁ  xed bid-ask spread for the price of an asset. In 
other words, this approach assumes a more realistic 
situation, where traded assets have quoted (and 
different) bid and ask prices. This type of model 
introduces fundamental changes in asset-portfolio 
strategies where the bid-ask spread is modelled as 
part of the portfolio problem. Simple examples show 
that it will imply a more cautious use of illiquid assets 
and a greater holding of liquid assets in the face of 
more volatile liabilities. Other examples show that 
dynamic hedging of derivatives will imply approximate 
bands for derivative prices, rather than unique deriva-
tive prices obtained from conventional frictionless 
models. If bid-ask spreads can vary randomly and, in 
extreme cases, widen to such an extent that it is 
optimal not to trade in these situations, then ex ante 
optimal trading strategies will imply much more 
conservative behaviour. 
14  This section draws on far more detailed and technical sections in Milne (2008b), which 
provides a bibliography of recent research in this area.
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allow the use of conventional microeconomic tools 
to analyze the effectiveness of appropriate policy 
instruments. For example, FIs will require knowledge 
of the aggregate behaviour of other FIs in the markets, 
if they are to model systemic risks in their risk-man-
agement systems. Regulators can play an important 
intermediary role in iterated stress-testing procedures 
to indicate possible feedbacks in asset prices from 
herd-like selling in certain asset markets. These types 
of regulatory intervention are at an early stage of 
development and require much more research and 
analysis.
Conclusion
In this article, I have outlined the complexity inherent 
in any modern risk-management system, which arises 
because there are shortcuts in the theoretical models. 
The professional risk manager must be aware of these 
simpliﬁ  cations and of the real dangers that ﬂ  ow from a 
mechanical application of the models. The problems 
are compounded by the difﬁ  culties in sensible calibra-
tion of model parameters. These are non-trivial prob-
lems that cannot be regulated away in any simple 
fashion. Furthermore, as has been indicated, sys-
temic risks can be introduced by embedding the 
basic risk-management model of an FI within a 
market system or ﬁ  nancial network. Far from being 
a novel problem, some (perhaps all) systemic-risk 
problems can be considered in the abstract as 
traditional market failures amenable to the tools of 
microeconomic analysis.
careful analysis to explore their many implications and 
deﬁ  ciencies. 
The oligopoly model of illiquidity can provide a con-
venient framework for exploring one source of sys-
temic risk, where trades of one (or more) large FIs will 
affect asset prices and the wealth of other FIs. This 
pecuniary externality can affect a non-trading FI by 
reducing the value of its assets. If the asset price falls 
far enough, the non-trading FI may face VaR and/or 
margin constraints that will induce it to trade so as to 
rebalance its portfolio. As recent events have illus-
trated, if this phenomenon affects a number of FIs, it 
can induce a cascade of selling and further decreases 
in asset prices in a downward spiral.
Using this basic approach, it is not hard to see, in 
principle, how some types of systemic risks might be 
analyzed. The pecuniary externalities induced from 
trading in illiquid markets can spill over into the port-
folio decisions of other FIs. Arguments that central 
bank intervention can be rationalized by attempts to 
reduce these price effects can be constructed.
17 But 
such arguments should be explored carefully because 
FI behaviour will be inﬂ  uenced by potential regulatory 
intervention in illiquid markets, implying that FI strat-
egies will economize on liquid balances, relying on 
expectations of substantial central bank intervention.
These are sketches of some simple ideas for model-
ling illiquid asset markets and the possibility of embed-
ding them in a risk-management model. A bonus in 
this approach is that it will provide a framework for 
17  See Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008) for a recent example.
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